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1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will provide some background information for the transitional justice (TJ) 
process in Burundi. I will address why Burundi is a relevant actor in the Great Lakes 
Region, why its TJ process as well as development issues should be seen as regional 
problems and why they should receive more attention from the international community. 
Then I will introduce the research question. After that I will describe the socio-economic 
and political situation in Burundi in 2014 and 2015 as well as mention a non-judicial 
tradition from pre-colonial period that is widely accepted locally and could be used to 
repair relationships that have been seriously damaged by the last 50 years of atrocities and 
armed conflicts. After that, I will provide the structure for this thesis, and finish this chapter 
with methodology clarification. 
1.1. Why do we need to think about Burundi at all?  
The Great Lakes region consists of several countries (Rwanda, Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Tanzania to mention the closest neighbors to Burundi) that by 2015 have each 
managed to establish a fragile peace, each in a different way. Yet, they are connected and 
should one fall back into a serious armed conflict, will all of them be impacted, if not 
militarily, then by refugee flows and economic instability.  
The other reason for focusing on Burundi is that during the last 5 decades, Burundi has 
been traumatised by two genocides and countless massacres, yet those tragedies have not 
received much international attention. When people talk about TJ, almost everyone can re-
call the atrocities in Rwanda, the failure of the international community to interfere in time, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) being mandated and the gacaca 
trials taking place all over Rwanda
1
. The second genocide in Burundi started, however, in 
                                                 
 
*The validity of the used websites has been last checked on 11 May 2015. Websites are hyper-
linked in the bibliography to the author of the article/report. Thus no separate links are provided 
there. 
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October 1993, half a year before Rwanda’s in April 1994, and was based on the same 
ethnic conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis. The civil war caused the death of possibly 
up to 300 000 people
2
.  
Yet no tribunal has been set up to investigate those crimes. Burundi is not known to be 
either a success-story or a cautionary tale in the sphere of TJ. In addition to international 
politics, described very well by Kaufman, I consider the local political will to cooperate 
with the international community and ability to draw attention to the country’s problems to 
be the biggest differences between received responses to atrocities in Rwanda and 
Burundi
3
. 
1.2. Research question 
Year 2015 marks 15 years since the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for 
Burundi (hereafter referred to as “Arusha Agreement”) was signed in Tanzania in 2000 to 
bring an end to an ethnically motivated civil war. Burundi has been ethnically divided since 
the colonization and mass atrocities have been committed by both the Hutu and the Tutsi 
ethnic groups throughout the past 50 years to gain or maintain political dominance.  
One apparent success of the implementation of Arusha Agreement is that there has been no 
armed conflict since 2008, so the country has managed to maintain “negative peace”. 
Negative peace refers to the absence of an armed conflict
4
, while positive peace is “the 
presence of justice”5, which “encompasses social justice, the uprooting of systematic 
discrimination and a more equitable distribution of power and resources”6. Positive peace is  
                                                                                                                                                    
 
1
 Detailed information about the related statistics can be found from websites for United Nations Depart-
ment of Public Information (2014), and United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2015). 
2
 Different sources claim different numbers between 200 000 and 300 000, but there is no official record. 
The fact of “genocide” was determined by the International Commission of Inquiry in Burundi, set up based 
on the UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1012 (1995). 
3
 Kaufman (2009), pages 229-260 
4
 Johan Galtung (1969) describes «structural violence” as negative peace with unjust and violent conse-
quences, preventing people from fulfilling their potential. 
5
 Cortright (2013) pages 6-7. 
6
 Aroussi and Vandeginste (2013), page 197 
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a “long-term condition that must be facilitated for the future, through building trust and 
encouraging greater interaction between previously antagonistic parties”7.  
Another success with Arusha Agreement implementation would be the power-sharing 
section of the Agreement, leading to adoption of a Constitution in 2005 and organising two 
sets of relatively democratic elections in 2005 and 2010.  
Arusha Agreement, however, entailed much more, like investigations into atrocities, truth-
seeking, reconciliation efforts, respect for human rights and, not least, good governance, 
democracy and development issues, none of which have been receiving any considerable 
attention, and progress towards achieving positive peace has not been started. Arusha 
Agreement was supposed to be the basis for peace and development in Burundi. 
I will analyse Arusha Agreement from the human rights, transitional justice and 
development angle to address the research question:  
In the light of Burundi’s political and socio-economic realities in 2015, what are the 
achievements and shortcomings in the implementation of the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in August 2000, and how can the 
process of national reconciliation be moved forward?  
Through my analysis I would like to establish what kind of approach could make the long-
term and positive peace as well as real development in Burundi possible while serving the 
interests of ordinary Burundians, not only the elite. TJ perspective and expectations of a 
person who, for example, has lost all family members and grown up as an orphan, who 
cannot read or write, who has not received any psychological help for the traumas 
experienced, who owns no land nor other property and whose only source of information is 
the hearsay and “truth” of others on the street, can be different from a traditional academic 
view. 
                                                 
 
7
 Phil Clark (2009), page 196 
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1.3. Background information 
Some background information about the human rights situation in Burundi is relevant when 
discussing the implementation of Arusha Agreement and shortcomings of the TJ process in 
Burundi so far, as well as the direction this process is taking now.  
1.3.1. Socio-economic situation in Burundi 
Population in Burundi is 10,2 million with 81,81% living in multidimensional poverty
8
. 
Human Development Index (HDI) 2014 ranks Burundi to place 180 of 187
9
. 67.2% of the 
population is literate, meaning that those aged 15 and over can read and write
10
. 56% drop 
out of primary schools, and only 28% enroll secondary schools
11
. Access to electricity is 
available to 2% of the population (CIA), while 1,3% of population uses Internet
12
. Based 
on the number of mobile subscriptions, Burundi ranks place 143 of 144
13
. 
Burundi’s economy is dependent on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Ca 50% of 
the budget is provided for by bilateral donors
14
. 40% of ODA to Burundi is cash grants, 
thus making corruption easy and tangible
15
. 
Global Competitiveness Report 2014/2015 ranks Burundi to place 139 of 144 countries
16
. 
Based on a thorough economic analysis on the use of ODA in Burundi, Bertelsmann 
Stiftung’s (BTI) Burundi country report 2014 suggests that the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) II from 2012 follows almost 100% the guidelines of the IMF and World 
Bank, in order to secure further external funding
17
. BTI adds:  
                                                 
 
8
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BDI 
9
 Poverty and nourishment related statistics can be found from websites to the World Bank, World Food 
Program, United Nations Statistics Division, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.  
10
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) statistics 
11
 UNDP (2014): HDI 2014 
12
 The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015: Page 509 
13
 The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015: Page 435 
14
 Seger/United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (29.12.2014), page 3, and Development Initiatives 
(2014).  
15
 ODA flows are depicted at http://devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Investments-to-End-Poverty-
Chapter-10-Burundi.pdf 
16
 The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015, page 13 
17
 BTI (2014), page 39 
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The capacity of the government for policy formulation is extremely limited. [...] 
Very substantial political and socioeconomic problems, and the pressing 
demands for short-term relief of the dire socioeconomic situation of the 
population, restrain the government’s ability to pursue strategic long-term 
goals. [...] long-term goals are very often sidelined by short-term interests, 
particularly maintaining and extending the ruling elite’s power18. 
UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) referred to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) fifth 
review of Burundi’s economic performance, when stating that the macroeconomic outlook 
due to “risks arising from election-related uncertainty, economic disruptions and violence, 
all of which could impact investment and growth”, was regarded as challenging19.  
1.3.2. Political situation in Burundi 
Fragile States Index Rankings 2014 give Burundi place 22 of 178
20
. Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 ranks Burundi to place 159 of 17521. 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2014/2015 provides different relevant ratings related 
to separation of powers and the rule of law
22
.  
When looking at the situation with civil and political rights, Freedom House classifies 
Burundi’s regime in 2014 as “Partly Free”23. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
not to mention many smaller local, regional and international civil society organisations, as 
well as governments and embassies of the biggest donor countries for Burundi, have 
throughout 2014 and the beginning of 2015 expressed deep concerns about the increased 
violations of freedom of association and peaceful assembly in Burundi. Those actors have 
also addressed the related crack-down of the opposition, the civil society and independent 
journalists by the Government and Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the ruling party 
                                                 
 
18
 BTI (2014), page 30 
19
 S/2015/36, page 10 
20
 The Fund for Peace (2014) 
21
 Transparency International (2015) 
22
 The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015, pages 408-421 
23
 “Partly Free countries are characterised by some restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, often in 
a context of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife, or civil war” (Freedom House). Rwanda receives in 
contrast rating “Not Free”. ”A Not Free country is one where basic political rights are absent, and basic civil 
liberties are widely or systematically denied” (Freedom House) 
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CNDD-FDD, especially now that the elections are approaching in June 2015. Unlawful 
imprisonments without trials, disappearances, intimidation of the critical “voices”, and 
politically motivated extrajudicial executions are just a few examples of the everyday life 
in Burundi
24
.  
The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Michel Frost, has 
criticised, as a result of his visit of Burundi in November 2014, the “repeated threats 
against human rights defenders and journalists and recalled that a free and independent 
media capable of exposing abuses of power and corruption was essential to safeguard civil 
liberties, promote transparency and foster the broad participation of citizens in public 
life”25.  BNUB reports on “no significant progress” in the fight against impunity as well as 
on slow progress “in building an independent, accessible and credible justice system”26. 
The situation can be summarised by “instabilities, institutional weaknesses and lack of 
human security”27. 
President of the Security Council described the political situation in Burundi in February 
2015 as follows: “The Security Council expresses concern for restriction on freedom of 
expression and opinion, peaceful assembly and association, as well as continued threats 
against journalists and representatives of civil society. [...] The Security Council further 
expresses its concern about the insufficient progress on the fight against impunity [...]”28. 
Another descriptive feature for Burundi is the politicizing of public services and the ruling 
party persistently gaining control over the administration. “Although the constellation of 
the government is in line with the principles laid out in the constitution, the country is 
increasingly becoming a de facto one-party state”29.  
                                                 
 
24
 More in BTI (2014) report. 
25
 S/2015/36, page 9 
26
 S/2015/36, pages 8-9 
27
 Taylor (2013/A) page 451 
28
 S/PRST/2015/6, page 3 
29
 BTI (2014), page 38 
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1.4. Social fabric and Bushingantahe 
As per today, no healing after the genocides and the civil war(s) has started, yet both ethnic 
groups are daily intertwined, living next to each other in local communities. People need to 
find out the truth, they need someone to admit their guilt, they need to know what 
happened and why, they need to start repairing their “social fabric”. A new generation of 
Burundians has grown up, many without parents, brothers, sisters, close relatives, friends, 
listening to the dinner conversations of adults, learning their subjective truths about the 
history and what had happened, and develop their perceptions about the people from the 
other ethnic group. As the genocides and massacres have been conducted to both ethnic 
groups, it is easy for political leaders to manipulate desperate, poor and often uneducated 
people for personal interests. Feeling of injustice is widespread and violence can be ignited 
very easily. The long-living practice of impunity only adds to the equation.  
The long-standing principles and values that Burundi was governed by before the 
colonisation, when ethnicity and political power-games were not part of people’s everyday 
lives, are gathered in a tradition called Bushingantahe. It has been used to settle local 
disputes justly by “the wise” in the communities, promoting dignity and forgiveness (for 
more information, see section 2.6.2). Discussion about how to make the possible TJ process 
more understandable as well as useful for the local population will be discussed in Chapter 
4.  
1.5. Structure of this thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a literature overview of relevant scholars’ standpoints regarding the 
peace agreements, power-sharing agreements, TJ terminology and identifies the main 
dilemmas when TJ mechanisms are chosen. Chapter 2 also identifies which views are 
relevant for this thesis as depending on a type of conflict, local conditions, history, 
timeframes, desired outcomes and methods of investigation, these topics should be 
addressed very differently.  The lessons from other’s experiences and academic opinions 
will be used to build a suitable TJ model for Burundi in Chapter 4.  
 8 
Chapter 3 focuses on a thorough analysis of Arusha Agreement and the related peace 
agreements signed consequently. I will identify the human rights clauses in the agreements, 
TJ mechanisms and role division to implement the Agreement. The second part of the 
chapter provides an overview of what has happened until 2015 in the implementation of the 
Agreement, analyses the proposed TRC legislature in the light of Arusha Agreement and 
UN standpoints, and makes references to the models of TJ in neighbouring countries. The 
President of Burundi has now started to pursue TJ through TRC. I will look into why he 
does it now, how he has planned to do it and how does it fit into the general framework 
agreed to in Arusha Agreement in 2000. 
Chapter 4 aims at suggesting a way forward for Burundi and TJ process based on successes 
and shortcomings of Arusha Agreement implementation until April 2015. As Burundi is 
basically only now starting with TJ, it is a good opportunity to make an educated 
suggestion for the country, especially considering that several neighboring countries have 
already tried different approaches with different success rates. I will also look into the 
traditional conflict resolution method in Burundi and see if its elements can be used to 
involve the population in the reconciliation process at a maximised level. 
Chapter 5 will conclude the thesis by answering the research question based on the findings 
throughout the document. 
1.6. Methodology 
This thesis is a qualitative interdisciplinary research where the results of the empirical 
comparative legal analysis identifying a suitable TJ framework for Burundi are placed into 
socio-economic and political context of the country in question. In principle, a “law in 
context” analysis is used to inquire into how TJ process is perceived by the society and 
how the proposed recommendations would fit the local realities to serve the interests of 
ordinary people. 
Focus of the analysis is on a peace agreement, signed in 2000 to end the long-lasting armed 
conflict and address the root-causes of that conflict, as well as on relevant legal framework 
and action plans adopted consequently both by the Government of the country in question 
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and the international community. The analysis provides also an overview of the achieved 
results in implementing the peace agreement, forming a baseline at the time of writing. 
This baseline is then used to build recommendations for future TJ processes and the peace 
agreement implementation, while considering the international law development as well as 
technological advancements over the last 15 years. 
Socio-economic as well as political situation assessment in Burundi is empirical as it is 
based on data and statistics collected by reliable multinational actors and intergovernmental 
agencies and confirmed by statements of representatives of different UN agencies as well 
as local and international civil society organisations and media outlets.  
Before beginning the analysis of the normative legal framework, I wanted to get an 
overview of the academic understanding for peace and TJ related terminology and 
dilemmas to formulate a framework with relevant definitions suitable for the context of this 
thesis (Chapter 2). I also wanted to learn about the TJ processes in Burundi’s neighbouring 
countries, to build on their successes and failures in the recommendations section. The 
books and articles studied are enlisted under bibliography. While Burundi is not a very 
well-known TJ case, I found a few published relevant studies and collections of interviews 
with Burundians, the findings of which have been referred to in the thesis. 
Arusha Agreement was signed in 2000 to end the civil war that started with genocide in 
1993. My analysis of the TJ process in Burundi in Chapter 3 starts therefore also from 1993 
as some minor direction-giving steps were taken before the conclusion of Arusha 
Agreement in 2000. 
UN Security Council has followed the peace process in Burundi and TJ pursuit since 1993 
and documented its viewpoints and recommendations in the resolutions, reports and 
guidelines. In addition to these, UN Security Council has also adopted general policies and 
definitions for fulfilling its mandate in different conflict areas. These have been valuable 
sources of information, in addition to Arusha Agreement and the following peace 
agreements with the rebel groups in 2003, 2006 and 2008, in assessing the TJ in Burundi 
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until today and making recommendations for the future. They are also enlisted under 
bibliography. 
My research has been done following the requirement that methodology must be thorough, 
systematic, justifiable and reproducible. I have used inductive reasoning when reviewing 
the findings and “synthesizing results” with focus on reliability of sources, quality and 
relevance of data and “selecting and weighing materials based on hierarchy and authority 
as well as understanding of the social context and interpretation” 30. 
Using the interdisciplinary approach for both analysis as well as recommendations’ part of 
the thesis helps tailoring a universally accepted framework of TJ and peace-building to a 
local context in a meaningful way. Analysing academic, civil society as well as diplomatic 
and political sources and establishing their common ground in goals, findings and opinions 
has helped me to develop a credible baseline in 2015 that the future recommendations can 
be built on. I hope that this thesis be used, as proposed by Dobinson and Johns, as part of a 
larger research, leading to future policy or strategy development and eventual change or 
reform in Burundi
31
. 
                                                 
 
30
 McConville and Chui (2007),  pages 32 and 40  
31
 McConville and Chui (2007), page 20 
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2 Terminology and literature overview 
There is a lot of literature available on TJ with its aims, means and related limitations and 
dilemmas. This chapter aims at identifying the definitions and elaborations that dominate 
the scholarly discussions, yet limit the scope covered to the concepts relevant for this 
thesis. The focus will be on power-sharing, TJ, reconciliation and Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) as central topics discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis. At the end of each 
section I will make a short reference to how the presented information relates to the 
situation in Burundi, as a preparation to analysis that follows. 
2.1 Peace-agreements 
Peace-agreements are signed to end armed conflicts and/or other states of emergency. As it 
is understandably difficult to get the military and political elite as well as guerillas around 
the negotiation table, the needs of different parties must be acknowledged so that the 
parties, at least in theory, have the hope that their expectations are seriously addressed. 
Often influential international actors and mediators are involved. Peace-agreements include 
an array of dilemmas, balancing between transition from the armed conflict to the rule of 
law and justice, human rights and structural reforms, reconciliation and accountability, just 
to name a few.  
As the old and new elites, sometimes of military background, are in charge of modifying 
the national legislation to accommodate the contents of the peace agreements, the actual 
implementation of the agreed noble goals, commitments and declarations run the risk of 
never fully materializing, as seems to be the case with Arusha Agreement of 2000. 
2.2 Power-sharing 
Power-sharing has not been given a specific legal definition or scope. In practice, however, 
the power-sharing components are political, economic, military and/or territorial and often 
end up “guaranteeing representation, control and/or influence in the government, the army 
and the security sector, the national economy and resources or over a specific territory to 
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the signatories.”32 Even though power-sharing agreements can include commitments for 
different structural improvements and pledges to respect and promote international human 
rights, the latter are often just no-cost means to guarantee parties’ real interests with “no 
consequences or sanctioning mechanisms for non-compliance” and to increase the external 
legitimacy of the peace process at the international level”33. 
Consociational power-sharing arrangements, studied in depth by Arend Lijphart, have four 
classic elements: “coalition government (between parties from different segments of 
society), proportionality (in the voting system and public sector), minority veto for areas of 
vital interest, and segmental group autonomy capable of enabling forms of self-government 
by groups over areas such as education”34. Burundi has such power-sharing agreement as 
will be discussed in the following chapters. 
As power-sharing agreements often invest enormous power to former belligerents or 
former political enemies at all stages of politics, criticism is natural.  Levitt writes, for 
example, that “in the case of democratically constituted governments, negotiating peace 
agreements with rebels, junta and warlords leads to an illegal peace”35. Cole notes that 
power-sharing governments should be temporary for the period of and purpose to restore 
democratic order, not rewards war criminals with political positions, and emphasises the 
necessity of vetting, meaning not allowing those bearing the greatest responsibility for the 
unrest to participate in established governments
36
. Power-sharing should, in any case, 
prevent recurrence of large-scale atrocities leading to such agreements in the first place. 
Political power-sharing agreements with military leaders who have “very little democratic 
legitimacy” are very common among African countries37. Manirakiza explains that “By 
involving all the stakeholders in the negotiations of peace arrangements and thereby 
                                                 
 
32
 Aroussi and Vandeginste (2013), page 184 
33
 Aroussi and Vandeginste (2013), page 190-193  
34
 Bell (2013), page 205 
35
 Levitt (2012), page 123 
36
 Cole (2013), page 270 
37
 Bell (2013), page 221 
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ensuring their representation in the government and other state institutions, post-conflict 
societies can establish the foundation for peace, rule of law, stability and development”38.  
Cole discusses how power-sharing satisfies the desire for peace more easily than the 
democratic will of the people, yet warns that the “continuation of this trend might well 
encourage incumbents to hijack electoral processes with the knowledge that any ensuing 
dispute will at worst result in a power-sharing deal”39. 
AU often supports the power-sharing-based peace arrangements (Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
Burundi, etc.) “for political expediency and necessity, instead of upholding the values of 
the rule of law and human rights that are articulated in its basic legal instruments”40. 
When discussing power-sharing in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Davis accepts that 
in some cases power-sharing might be the only way to end the violence, yet emphasises 
that functioning state institutions and justice system are prerequisites for TJ and power-
sharing to have the expected effect, and that vetting procedure and exclusion of those most 
responsible for atrocities are essential in re-designing law enforcement and security 
forces
41
. 
Hansen describes similar trends in Kenya’s power-sharing deal and cautions that should the 
internal power struggles take priority over achieving societal transformation and should the 
lack of political take prevail over enforcement of the power-sharing provisions, which often 
are manipulated by the elite and included in peace-agreements only as formalities, the real 
value of TJ process can be very limited
42
. 
For Burundi, Arusha Agreement regulates power-sharing in detail, providing a recipe for 
the new Constitution. 
                                                 
 
38
 Manirakiza (2013), page 239 
39
 Cole (2013), page 257 
40
 Manirakiza(2013), page 243 
41
 Davis (2013), page 301  
42
 Hansen (2013), page 320-322 
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2.3 Transitional justice 
Transitional justice (TJ) is a process to re-establish the rule of law in conflict and post-
conflict societies. UN defines the rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all 
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards”43. In addition, UN defines TJ as comprising 
the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society as attempts 
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international 
involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-
seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof
44
.  
By accommodating these norms and rules to a specific legal system, UN considers them to 
be more effective and suitable than to simply export/import ready-made models “which, all 
too often, reflect more the individual interests or experience of donors and assistance 
providers than they do the best interests or legal development needs of host countries”45. 
Teitel defines TJ as “a multidisciplinary field of research and practice linked to the fight 
against impunity and the broader domains of human rights and conflict resolution”46. 
Blackford describes TJ  as reflecting “how societies address legacies of past human rights 
abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, including genocide or civil 
war, in order to build a more democratic, just or peaceful future”47. Clark, Kaufman and 
Nicolaidis argue convincingly that the term “transitional justice” should be replaced with 
“post-conflict reconstruction” as the goal of the “transition” is often unclear and the term 
“justice” can be too strongly emphasised over other long-term considerations48.  
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Hazan divides TJ into 4 phases: 
(1) The armed conflict or the repression phase [...] ;  
(2) The immediate post-conflict period (first 5 years), when the war-lords can [...] 
mobilise the media and networks loyal to them;  
(3) The medium term (from 5 to 20 years), when the society undergoing social 
and political reconstruction works out new points of reference [...];  
(4) The long-term, with the rise of a new generation much more receptive to the 
need to overcome old divisions
49
.  
Different TJ mechanisms facilitating either accountability, truth, reparations or 
reconciliation suit different phases.  
As the analysis in Chapter 3 will demonstrate, for Burundi there is currently a slight 
overlap between finalizing the second and starting the third phase. There is also an 
additional risk that Burundi will fall back into phase 1, if the elections in June 2015 do not 
go as expected for the ruling party. Suggestions in Chapter 4 will, however, aim at keeping 
the country in phase three and plan long-term to reach phase 4. 
2.4 Amnesties  
Amnesty is often the central controversial topic in TJ literature as balance needs to be struck 
between restoring a sense of justice for the victims through trials, punishments and 
reparations from one side, and prioritizing development and reconciliation on the other. 
Freeman has conducted a detailed analysis on the topic of amnesties and for the purpose of 
this thesis, I use his definition:  
Amnesty is an extraordinary legal measure whose primary function is to 
remove the prospect and consequences of criminal liability for designated 
individuals or classes of persons in respect of designated types of offences 
irrespective of whether the persons concerned have been tried for such offences 
in a court of law
50
. 
International institutions are formally against amnesties. The UN Secretary General report 
(2004) states clearly that “United Nations-endorsed peace agreements can never promise 
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amnesties for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human 
rights, and, where we are mandated to undertake executive or judicial functions, United 
Nations-operated facilities must scrupulously comply with international standards for 
human rights in the administration of justice”51. UN Secretary General report (2011) states 
that “The United Nations has strengthened the normative framework supporting transitional 
justice, including the right to justice, truth and guarantees of non-recurrence.”52 
Freeman describes UN’s position as a legal opinion, not law, but emphasises that as a result 
of non-compliance, UN can refuse to witness an agreement with amnesty clause, to 
participate in the amnesty-related process, but most importantly discourage “donor 
engagement in the implementation of a broader peace-building program”53.  
Teitel introduces a concept of “humanity’s law” where the interstate international law is 
shifting towards a human-centered law and politics combining civil and political rights 
with social and economic rights
54
, and thus, in a way, re-defining the concept of rule of 
law. “Humanity law challenges the notion of any immunity from accountability; the acting 
political leadership is held responsible for its decisions concerning the use of force”55. 
The analysis in Chapter 3 will demonstrate in detail the use of amnesties in Burundi’s TJ 
process so far. The conclusion by Vandeginste, Aroussi and Feyter that “power-sharing has 
become a vehicle of transitional justice [...] [which] easily leads to impunity even when it 
does not include blanket amnesties” describes Burundi’s situation very well56. 
2.5 Reconciliation, healing and social transformation 
Reconciliation is the central buzzword in TJ literature. It is often implied that it happens 
almost automatically after some mechanisms have been launched, be it then political 
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power-sharing, truth commissions or some other choice. Unfortunately, traumatised 
communities lack the solidarity needed to transform and develop as relationships are 
broken and trust is lacking.  
Buckley-Zistel refers to the process where a society moves from negative peace into 
positive peace and where cooperation and trust replace “tolerance in existence” as “social 
transformation”57. A similar thought is supported by Gasana who writes about the 
importance of healing the pain to avoid hopelessness, fear and frustration from taking over 
and concludes that the “ultimate common goal for peacebuilding and development 
interventions is therefore to transform broken or imbalanced relationships through healing, 
justice, education, empowerment, and social, economic and cultural integration 
processes”58. Clark takes it even one step further, saying that reconciliation aims at re-
building relationships through a process of “re-humanising both survivors and perpetrators 
after violence” because perpetrators have often de-humanised the victims to have a 
justification for their action, losing a sense of humanity and empathy for the enemy 
identity.
59
  
In Burundi, as described also by Taylor, establishing the common truth and acknowledging 
the atrocities are intertwined with reconciliation, and communities need to understand each 
other’s sufferings, losses, and the “common experiences of victimisation”60. Clark also 
explains that forgiveness is distinct from reconciliation as the latter builds new 
relationships while “forgiveness requires only that a victim forego feelings of resentment 
and desire for direct revenge against the perpetrator”61. 
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2.5.1 Bushingantahe 
Ingelære and Kohlhagen have researched thoroughly a traditional Burundian alternative 
non-judicial conflict resolution mechanism called Bushingantahe, referring to “an ideal, a 
set of virtues, constituting a social reference to righteousness, socialness, sagacity, self-
control, responsibility, honor, discretion, equity, truthfulness, coherence and balance in 
speech, moral and economic independence and prosperity”62. According to historian 
Christine Deslaurier, the term Bushingantahe, covers the moral, cultural, social and legal 
dimensions of this institution and lacks any real equivalent, even in neighbouring 
countries
63
.  
Based on hundreds of interviews, Ingelære and Kohlhagen concluded that ordinary 
Burundians didn’t associate the terms like “norm” or ”law”  
with the ideas of justice, peace or equity, but rather with the ideas of constraint, 
arbitrariness or political power [...].[...] When asked about the competences of a 
good judge, however, people usually referred to moral integrity, presence or the 
ability to make people respect his decisions. [...] more than 90 percent of 
interviewees would refuse to have a case judged by a single judge
64
.  
These findings demonstrate how ordinary people understand social rules and how they 
evaluate the accomplishments of the national courts using for them understandable 
Bushingantahe principles. 
UNDP has supported the project of identifying the bashingatahe and establishing the 
National Council of Bashingantahe in 2002, yet the ruling party CNDD-FDD is not 
supportive of their role because traditionally the precondition to be considered worthy of 
the position of bashingantahe was economic independence to avoid bias in decisions and 
the institution was dominated by urban Tutsi elites. In 2010, municipal law was changed by 
the ruling party terminating the role of bashingantahe as local mediators and conciliators. 
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In practice, however, people still widely turn to them in family and neighborhood 
disputes
65
.  
2.5.2 Truth-seeking 
Security Council has defined truth commissions as “official, temporary, non-judicial fact-
finding bodies that investigate a pattern of abuses of human rights or humanitarian law 
committed over a number of years. These bodies take a victim-centered approach and 
conclude their work with a final report of findings of fact and recommendations”66. In 2011 
Security Council added that truth commissions “can signal a break with the past and assist 
in engendering trust and confidence in newly reconstituted justice and security 
institutions”67. “Truth commission can complement or replace criminal proceedings”.68  
Freeman describes a truth commission as “a genuine forum for truth-telling and as a means 
to map a post-conflict future”, but remains critical as to its effect in real life, saying that the 
commissions “usually do not produce confessions of guilt from political and military 
leaders or powerful state officials. Those who bear greatest responsibility seem to bear least 
sense of shame: they have usually defended their actions as having been required by the 
national interest”69 and concludes that without shaming reconciliation is impossible. 
Despite its preliminary praise of the truth commissions and listing of many possible 
positive outcomes, the Security Council also noted possible fall-outs, caused for example 
by “weak civil society, political instability, victim and witness fears about testifying, a 
weak or corrupt justice system, insufficient time to carry out investigations, lack of public 
support and inadequate funding. Truth commissions are invariably compromised if 
appointed through a rushed or politicized process”70. Security Council also proposes that in 
order for the truth-telling processes to succeed, the commissions “must enjoy meaningful 
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independence and have credible commissioner selection criteria and processes. … Finally, 
many such commissions will require strong international support to function, as well as 
respect by international partners for their operational independence".
71
  
The UN evaluation in 2011 states that the truth commissions  
can quickly lose credibility when not properly resourced, planned and 
managed, [...] are manipulated for political gain or involve insufficient efforts 
to solicit stakeholder input [...]. Strong national ownership is essential. 
Unfortunately, Governments have a mixed record of compliance with truth 
commission recommendations, evidencing the need for follow-up mechanisms 
and active and long-term political engagement from the international 
community and civil society. United Nations support for the implementation of 
recommendations needs to be incorporated early in planning processes. There is 
growing recognition that truth commissions should also address the economic, 
social and cultural rights dimensions of conflict to enhance long-term peace and 
security. 
72
  
This is essential for Burundi’s TRCs set-up, as can be seen from the analysis in Chapter 3. 
Taylor emphasises the need to make sure that the TRC’s objectives would correlate with 
the expectations and needs of the ordinary Burundians as only then could the effort be 
meaningful. He fears that the process will be disconnected from the local communities, and 
introduces concepts like “a localized lens” and “grass-root impact of transitional justice”73 
which I will address later in the analysis. 
Clark identifies three processes when societies try to uncover the truth after conflicts: truth-
telling, truth-hearing and truth-shaping. The first two are the sides of the same coin, 
possibly a form of dialogue, while truth-shaping is a tool authorities could abuse to re-
interpret events, purge history and manipulate evidence
74
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Buckley-Zistel’s discussion on social transformation states that its success is based on how 
the past is remembered and that focus should shift from justice to social reconciliation, 
namely how people deal with the past on a daily basis. She says that ethnic groups living 
intertwined lives often “pretend peace” and demonstrate “chosen amnesia”, meaning that 
they make a deliberate decision to forget some aspects of the past. They usually do not 
have another choice as talking “would upset the social balance”75. She emphasises a need 
for “collective memory” in societies with low level of formal education and oral daily 
information transmission culture
76
. 
An understandable way of truth-telling for ordinary Burundians would be Bushingantahe. 
However, as it will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, the ruling party has chosen a different 
approach. 
2.6 Role of international community 
Jennifer Welsh, currently the UN Special Adviser at the Assistant Secretary-General level 
on the Responsibility to Protect, expressed the need for the international community to take 
action in case of large-scale human rights violations in some countries in the following 
way: “We are living in a climate of heightened expectations for the international 
community to “do something” when populations are experiencing natural disasters or man-
made catastrophes”77. Two principles have been developed for interference in domestic 
affairs of states: universality and responsibility to protect. 
2.6.1 Universality 
UN notes that “domestic justice systems should be the first resort in the pursuit of 
accountability. However, where these systems are unable or unwilling to prosecute 
perpetrators of international crimes, the international community stands ready to 
respond”78. This is done under the universality principle which means that “some crimes 
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are so grave that all countries have an interest in prosecuting them. [...] this exceptional 
form of jurisdiction is rightly reserved for the prosecution of only the most serious crimes 
[...] its use raises complex legal, political and diplomatic questions”.79 
Teitel discusses how a crime against humanity is a breach against a “core global rule-of-
law value” and how the humanity law “offers no implied basis for immunity of political 
actions”.80 Teitel claims that even though ICC has a jurisdiction to prosecute, ICC has the 
ultimate authority to decide whether or not to do it and that sometimes indictment and 
search for accountability poses “major risks for the fragile peace and security” and as a 
result having the opposite effect on the population as a whole
81
. 
The actual involvement of the international community in the Burundi genocide settlement 
and the implementation of the goals indoctrinated by the UN institutions will be analysed 
in Chapter 3. 
2.6.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
Mass atrocities happening in one country should not be passively observed and tolerated by 
international community. A principle called R2P has been adopted in order to unify the 
rules of engagement.  
The three pillars of the responsibility to protect are:  
1. The protection responsibilities of the State. The State carries the main responsibility 
to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;  
2. International assistance and capacity-building. The international community has a 
responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling their responsibility to 
protect;  
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3. Timely and decisive response. The international community has a responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their 
incitement. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the 
international community must take collective action to protect the populations in 
question.
 82
 
R2P makes sovereignty a responsibility, giving people in conflict, and hopefully also post-
conflict societies, some sort of a guarantee that their human rights will be protected if their 
own state is unable or unwilling to do it.
83
 The implementation has, of course, proved to be 
challenging as the basis for the concept to realise is the existence of political will of the 
international community
84
. The different international community approach to Rwanda and 
Burundi, closest to this thesis, is a clear example that similar situations can receive 
different amount of attention and support. 
The UN Secretary General report A/68/947-S/2014/449 from 11 July 2014, recognises that 
the three pillars of R2P “are of equal weight, mutually reinforcing, non-sequential”85, 
focuses on pillar II, namely encouragement, capacity-building and protection assistance, to 
enhance international community’s role in preventing the states from falling into 
“systematic violence and atrocity crimes”86.  
The report identifies 3 stages in the development of atrocity crimes: 
Stage 1. The presence of one or more of the following factors: presence of 
armed conflict or other forms of instability; a record of serious violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law, including persistent patterns 
of discrimination; economic deprivation and related disparities; weaknesses in 
state structures; motives or incentives to commit atrocity crimes, including the 
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presence of exclusionary ideology; [...]; the presence of actors with the capacity 
to engage in such crimes. Preventive action: focused strategies to build national 
resilience. 
Stage 2. The risk(s) from stage 1 transform into real threat(s), because of crises 
or political transition. Human rights record worsens. 
Stage 3. Imminent risk of atrocity crimes.
87
 
UN has also detected the risk-factors that should be eliminated to prevent (new) repressions 
and related armed conflicts, and based on history and tradition, possibly mass atrocities. In 
its 2011 evaluation, UN described how  
States marked by ineffective governance, repressive policies, poverty, high 
rates of violent crime and impunity pose significant threats to international 
peace and security. Deep capacity deficits in State justice and security 
institutions, exacerbated by widespread corruption and political interference, 
lead to diminishing levels of citizen security and economic opportunity. 
Resentment, distrust or outright hostility towards the Government grows. 
Radicalized ideological movements often stand ready to harness these 
sentiments, inciting marginalized groups, unemployed youth and criminal 
elements to challenge the established order through violent means
88
.  
The description above is Burundi 2015 in a nutshell. As will be analysed in Chapter 3, 
Burundi is in a serious threat of falling back into a cycle of violence, and international 
community should, differently from 1993 genocide, get involved in peacekeeping as well 
as peacebuilding programmes before the conflict escalates as a result of elections in June 
2015. More specific steps will be looked at in Chapter 4. 
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3 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 
(2000) and TJ process in Burundi until April 2015 
 
This chapter aims at answering the first part of the research question, namely what are the 
achievements and shortcomings in the implementation of Arusha Agreement. The chapter 
is divided in 4 subgroups: (1) Arusha Agreement analysis, identifying the main clauses 
related to human rights and TJ; (2) International law obligations for Burundi; (3) Analysis 
of TJ in Burundi from ca 1993-2015 and the role of the international community in 
supporting Burundi’s move towards the rule of law; (4) brief analysis of the motivation of 
the government of Burundi to set up TRC in 2014, after delaying it for over a decade. 
3.1 Arusha Agreement 
The main goal of Arusha Agreement, recorded in the Preamble, notes that signatory parties, 
as well as parties who later agreed to Arusha Agreement contents via ceasefire-agreements, 
like the current President’s political party CNDD-FDD, reaffirm their  
unwavering determination to put an end to the root causes underlying the 
recurrent state of violence, bloodshed, political instability, genocide and exclusion 
which is inflicting severe hardships and suffering on the people of Burundi, and 
seriously hampers the prospects for economic development and the attainment of 
equality and social justice in our country.  
Art. 3 of the Preamble continues that  
The Parties commit themselves to refrain from any act or behavior contrary to 
the provisions of the Agreement, and to spare no effort to ensure that the said 
provisions are respected and implemented in their letter and spirit in order to 
ensure the attainment of genuine unity, reconciliation, lasting peace, security 
for all, solid democracy and on equitable sharing of resources in Burundi. 
Protocol I provides an overview of the history and nature of the conflict, explicitly Art. 4, 
where Parties “recognize that: (a) The conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely 
important ethnic dimensions; (b) It stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to 
and/or remain in power”. Chapter 2 of Protocol I is dedicated to political, judicial, 
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economic, cultural and social solutions to end violence and build up the society as planned. 
These are active choices promoting reconciliation that I will use in Chapter 5 as solutions 
when discussing the possible TJ outcomes and mechanisms for Burundi in 2015 and 
onwards. Provisions related to political reconciliation and reconstruction through power-
sharing have been followed up. This makes sense as  
impunity for past human rights violations is one area where interests of former 
enemies easily meet. [...] Power-sharing agreements between opponents with 
blood-stained hands probably offer the most tangible evidence for the relevance 
of this realist perspective. In fact, the interests of those opponents converge 
when both parties can push back truth-telling and/or criminal prosecution
89
. 
Very important for this thesis is Art. 8 of Chapter 2 in Protocol I as it provides the future 
National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with three extensive mandates: (a) 
investigation (to “bring to light and establish the truth regarding the serious acts of violence 
[...] from independence (1 July 1962) to the date of signature of the Agreement, classify the 
crimes and establish the responsibilities, as well as the identity of the perpetrators and the 
victims”); (b) Arbitration and reconciliation (not acted upon at the time of writing); (c) 
Clarification of history (“The purpose of this clarification exercise shall be to rewrite 
Burundi’s history so that all Burundians can interpret it in the same way” (not acted upon at 
the time of writing)). Additionally, Arusha Agreement establishes how the Commissioners 
will be appointed. 
Protocol I Chapter 2 Art. 9(6) provides for the set-up of the UN Security Council’s 
international judicial commission of inquiry and the application by the government for the 
set-up of the international criminal tribunal by the UN Security Council (result described in 
Chapters 3 and 4).  
Protocol II, called “Democracy and Good Governance”, is basically a recipe for Burundi’s 
new Constitution, including a whole “Charter of Fundamental Rights”, power-sharing 
arrangements for different branches of the government, and appointing an independent 
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Ombudsperson. I will hereby like to draw attention to 3 articles: (1) “The task of 
government shall be [...] in particular to heal the divisions of the past, to improve the 
quality of life of all Burundians, and to ensure that all Burundians are able to live in 
Burundi free from fear, discrimination, disease and hunger” (Art. 1(5), Protocol II); (2) “In 
its functioning the Government shall respect the separation of powers, the rule of law, and 
the principles of good governance and transparency in the management of public affairs” 
(Art. 1(6), Protocol II); and (3) “temporary immunity” for “politically motivated crimes”  
(Protocol II Chapter II Art. 22(2)c)).  
Protocol III is called “Peace and Security for All”. While Chapter 1 defines what those 
concepts mean for Burundi and comes with some suggestions, Chapter 2 identifies the 
causes of the violence and insecurity in Burundi. For example, “disruption of the traditional 
socio-political system in effect under the monarchy” (Art. 2(4)), “failure to satisfy the basic 
needs of the citizens as a result of underdevelopment and lack of a sound economic 
policy[...]” (Art. 1 (5)(e)), “The unbridled struggle for power which, following the principle 
that “end justifies the means”, resulted in recourse to violence and the deliberate 
manipulation of ethnic sentiments[...]“ (Art. 1 (7)), etc.. Art. 6 critically enlists the 
consequences of the insecurity and violence, all of which are still present in Burundi in 
spring 2015 as well, e.g. culture of violence, widespread abuse of power corruption, 
plundering of natural resources, etc.. Art. 8 of Chapter I goes on to enlist the duties of the 
State in regards to human rights. 
Protocol IV is called ”Reconstruction and Development”. Chapters 2 and Chapter 3 of that 
Protocol are relevant for this thesis. Namely, Art. 13 describes political reconstruction:  
Political reconstruction is aimed at making national reconciliation and peaceful 
coexistence possible, and must be directed towards the establishment of the rule 
of law. In this context, the following programmes and measures shall be 
undertaken: (a) Launching of a multi-faceted national reconciliation 
programme; (b) Promotion of the rights and freedoms of the human person; (c) 
Education of the population in the culture of peace; (d) Initiation of tangible 
actions for the advancement of women; (e) Reform of the judicial system; (f) 
Support of democratization, including strengthening of the parliamentary 
system and support for the political party system; (g) Support for the 
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development and strengthening of civil society; (h) Provision of support for 
independent media.  
Art.-s 14, 15 and 16 focus on a launching of a long-term economic and social development 
programme which would “embark on the path of sustainable growth of equity”. As most of 
the objectives are not met in the spring 2015, I will focus on them and the guidelines in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis as possible means in the future TJ process. 
3.2 Human rights obligations applicable to Burundi 
Burundi has ratified the majority of relevant international human rights instruments, to the 
extent that several of them, for example Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant of 
Economic and Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) and African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), are mentioned 
in the Constitution of March 2005 (Art.19) as directly applicable and prevailing over 
conflicting domestic legislation. Others, not mentioned above, would be the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions with the 1977 two additional protocols on the law of armed conflict, Optional 
Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict, Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) (long delay in actual 
enforcement from 2004), Convention Against Torture (CAT), International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), protocols to ACHPR on 
the establishment of an African Court and on the rights of women in Africa, African 
Charter on the rights and welfare of the child, etc.. The practice of invoking and applying 
the international human rights conventions in practice is, however, scarce (statistics in 
Chapter 1, analysis in Chapters 3 and 4).  
Burundi ratified the Genocide Convention in May 2003 allowing no retrospective 
application. However, as a result of customary international law, the prohibition of crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and other rules in the Conventions 
apply also to crimes committed before 2003 (erga omnes rules). Seen from this perspective, 
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such serious crimes could come under jurisdiction of the Special Court (if ever 
established), but that, of course, is again dependent on the political will of those in power.  
Burundi delayed the ratification of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute which 
entered into force only from December 2004, even though Burundi signed the Statute 
already in January 1999. According to Art.11(3) and Art. 24(1) ICC has jurisdiction to 
handle war crimes only from the date of ratification. 
3.3 TJ in Burundi until April 2015 
Even though the cycles of violence have taken place from the independence of Burundi in 
1962, only minimal efforts were made in the TJ field before the 1990s’ democratisation 
attempts by President Buyoya (political party UPRONA). Amnesty law from September 
1993, promoted by Buyoya, was an attempt for reconciliation in the society. The scope of 
crimes included in the amnesty provisions was very wide and covered all the events from 
1965 onwards. As a result of the law implementation, 5000 of 7500 prisoners were 
released
90
. 
The first democratically elected Hutu president Ndadaye (political party FRODEBU) was 
assassinated on 21 October 1993. The large-scale massacres of the Tutsi civilians followed 
the assassination. Until today it is not clear whether the attacks were planned by the rising 
political elite or whether it was a spontaneous reaction to the assassination of their Hutu 
president. The so-called “massacre trials” were held, but the overall opinion was that the 
political elite was not reached because the focus was on the implementation of the coup 
rather than planning and organizing, thus impunity prevailed and was further negotiated by 
the perpetrators into Arusha Agreement
91
.  
A preparatory fact-finding mission to Burundi (Ake-Huslid mission) took place in March 
1994. As the mandate of the mission was political, not judicial, the names of the 
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perpetrators, even though available, were not made public
92
. The report of the mission 
suggested setting up international inquiry with judicial mandate. The UN Security Council 
fact-finding mission in August 1994, however, concluded that focus of TJ should be on 
strengthening the national judicial system over the international judicial mandate, thus 
choosing maintaining negative peace and fragile stability over accountability or 
reconciliation
93
.   
Based on the UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1012 (1995), International 
Commission of Inquiry in Burundi was set up in order to establish the facts relating to the 
assassination of President Ndadaye in 1993 and to establish facts related to massacres and 
other following related serious acts of violence. The mandate included also a request to 
propose measures to, among other matters, eradicate impunity and promote national 
reconciliation in Burundi. As a pure fact-finding mission, the Commission did not get 
access to official crimes-related files, the documents they saw were in Kirundi, and copies 
were not allowed. The work was troubled by the security issues both in Bujumbura and the 
whole land, inadequate resources, cultural and linguistic challenges and illiteracy which 
lead to news travelling from mouth to mouth. The Commission concluded that  
the assassination of President Ndadaye, as well as that of the person 
constitutionally entitled to succeed him, was planned beforehand as an integral 
part of the coup that overthrew him, and that the planning and execution of the 
coup was carried out by officers highly placed in the line of command of the 
Burundian Army. The Commission considers, however, that with the evidence 
at hand, it is not in a position to identify the persons that should be brought to 
justice for this crime.
94
  
The Commission also concluded that “acts of genocide against the Tutsi minority were 
committed in Burundi in October 1993, and that international jurisdiction should be 
asserted with respect to these acts”95. 
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President Buyoya requested in 1997 that the international criminal tribunal for Burundi be 
set up, but it never happened because the UN Secretary-General considered the 
circumstances in Burundi unsuitable for an international tribunal at that time, but reserved a 
possibility to return to the matter
96
. The Special rapporteur Pinheiro, condemning the 
conclusion of the International Commission of Inquiry to let the national weak justice 
system in Burundi prosecute those guilty of the genocide, coup and massacres, 
recommended once more the setting up of the international tribunal
97
. Due to considerable 
disagreements within the UN about the priorities when choosing TJ mechanisms in 
Burundi, very little happened until Arusha Agreement was concluded in 2000. The fact that 
those implicated in the killings and war crimes continued to exercise power, “demonstrated 
to people in both Burundi [...] that influential governments were willing to tolerate 
slaughter in a region that was not of strategic concern”.98 
All of the above-mentioned missions took place at the time of an armed conflict. The actual 
peace didn’t arrive even at the signing of Arusha Agreement in 2000 as the main rebel 
groups were not part of the signatories, and later used the political climate to press for 
transitional immunities. CNDD-FDD signed a Global Ceasefire Agreement (GCA) on 16 
November 2003, establishing under Article 2 temporary (or provisional immunity) to all 
leaders and combatants of the CNDD-FDD, all the security forces of the government of 
Burundi and also for those already convicted for “political crimes”. Vandeginste writes 
how after the victory of CNDD-FDD party and appointment of Pierre Nkurunziza as the 
President, a commission was set up to identify all political prisoners. All those enlisted 
were released provisionally in 2005 and 2006 by the decrees of the Minister of Justice (not 
the prosecutor nor based on a national piece of legislation). They could possibly have to 
appear in front of the Special Chamber or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission at 
some point in the future.  A total of 3299 persons were released
99
. 
                                                 
 
96
 S/1997/547, paragraph 18 
97
 A/51/459 (7.10.1996) 
98
 Human Rights Watch (2009) 
99
 Vandeginste (2010), page 105 
 32 
Pierre Nkurunziza, previously organizing and implementing guerilla and rebel activities 
and atrocities in the bushes, is now the President of the nation. Arusha Agreement entailed 
no vetting clauses for presidential position, yet the Constitution of March 2005 prevented 
former criminals from running for the office. The Electoral code, however, included an 
exception for the first elections after the Electoral Code was passed stating that those 
having provisional immunity can exercise their civil and political rights, even in case of 
criminal conviction, and this clause was never contested in the Constitutional Court
100
. 
The other rebel group Palipehutu-FNL signed several peace Agreements (Dar-Es-Salaam 
Agreement in June 2006, a Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreeement (CCA) in September 
2006 and the final one in December 2008), set up a political party in April 2009 and named 
a president candidate for 2010 elections. Their agreements contained similar temporary 
immunity clauses.  
In principle the terms “transition period” and “transitional immunity” could be expected to 
match in terms of time. Art 13(2) of Protocol II defines transition period’s end: “The 
transition period shall culminate upon the election of the new President. The presidential 
election shall take place after the first democratic election of the National Assembly”. In 
reality, the first (and current) President was appointed by the first democratically elected 
National Assembly in 2005, thus marking the end of the transitional period, even though 
the civil war had not ceased by that time yet. The time period for the “provisional” or 
“temporary” immunity, however, was not specified, and interestingly enough, the 
transitional period was already over by that time of signing the last peace agreements. 
Vandeginste writes that “it was stipulated that the provisional immunity was granted until 
the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee and the Special Tribunal. [...] 
as long as neither of the two mechanisms is established, the immunity continues to 
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apply”101. Even though amnesty as such was not agreed on without the limits established in 
the international law, the creative use of provision immunities gave the same result in 
practice. 
The Constitutional Court in Burundi has been awarded wide powers to safeguard the TJ 
law in Burundi, yet as per today, the Court judges are appointed by the President, and the 
Court has a reputation of a political player. When looking at the mandate of the Court, 
Vandeginste clearly points at a lacunae in the Court’s jurisdiction that the executive branch 
is widely taking advantage of in the TJ process. Namely, the Court can rule on cases 
regarding the constitutionality of the passed legislation, but not the ministerial and 
presidential decrees that are in the autonomous powers of the executive actor in question. 
This, in practice, means that as the TJ until today has largely been executed through such 
decrees (even though surely unconstitutional in nature), they cannot be analysed by the 
Constitutional Court, for example releasing “political prisoners”102. Another obvious 
problem is the actual access to the Court as many cases are thrown out based on 
technicalities. 
With its resolution S/RES/1650 (2005), Security Council expressed its support for 
Burundi's TJ process, insisted on TJ’s importance in rebuilding the nation and stressed “the 
need to put in place the reforms provided for in Arusha Agreement for Peace and 
Reconciliation in Burundi” and encouraged “the Burundian authorities to continue to work 
with [...] the establishment of the mixed Truth Commission and the Special Chamber 
within the court system of Burundi referred to in resolution 1606 of 20 June 2005”.  
National Consultations were organised by UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) in 
2009 and 2010 to establish the expectations of ordinary Burundians to the TJ process and 
developing of a possible draft law for TRC that would help serve those expectations as well 
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as comply with international law standards
103
. Extensive fieldwork by Ingelære and 
Kohlhagen reveals that expectations were related to the revitalisation of daily life and 
interactions, dialogue, festivities, ceremonies, reunions, strengthening of social fabric, 
honoring the victims and a wish to come together and restore the social relations that were 
destroyed by the atrocities and the long civil war
104
.  
Based on his fieldwork in Burundi, Taylor writes that the interviewees, when discussing 
reparations, mainly referred to forward-looking purposes that would contribute to the 
improvement of life conditions, emphasizing that addressing the root cause of Burundi’s 
violence, namely unequal access to resources, and focusing on sustainable recovery, are 
essential to meet the expectations, but that re-burials stand high on priority list
105
. Ingelære 
and Kohlhagen also concluded that ordinary Burundians emphasised largely a non-
prosecutorial approach that would create a space to coming together again, making 
references to Bushingantahe tradition and principles of rehabilitation and reconciliation as 
expected  results of the TJ process
106
. 
In July 2011, President Nkurunziza announced the plan to establish the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), after which a special tribunal would be formed.
107
 
According to Amnesty International’s assessment, the then presented draft law on the TRC 
did not comply with international standards, and victims would still be denied truth, justice 
and reparations
108
. Impunity Watch added that the draft law didn’t comply with the 
expectation of the Burundian people expressed during the 2010 National Consultations 
either
109
. 
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Recommendations were made by local journalists, local as well as international civil 
society organisations and international TJ experts, but Burundi’s government ignored 
everything. The TRC act was passed (with boycott from opposition) on April 17
th
 2014, 
having significantly different contents than the draft law had had and ignoring the 
recommendations of many knowledgeable actors. As a result, the Commission members 
would all be Burundian citizens, handpicked by the President, thus excluding international 
expertise. As after the 2010 elections, CNDD-FDD controls both the legislature and the 
executive branches, TRC’s impartiality is doubtful.  
In addition, TRC has four years to fulfill an extensive, almost impossible, mandate: (1) 
establish the truth about mass atrocities between 1962 and 2008; (2) identify and map mass 
graves; (3) promote reconciliation and forgiveness; (4) propose a reparation programme
110
. 
TRC gets to decide how the truth-telling will be organised and what cases will be 
investigated and heard
111
. Even though Arusha Agreement mentions two mechanisms 
(TRC and the criminal tribunal), the final draft has removed all references to criminal 
prosecution as well as the obligation to publish the list of alleged perpetrators
112
. As a 
result Burundi’s government has chosen a path contrary to the international community’s 
recommendations.  The preamble of GCA gave Arusha Agreement a superior source of law 
status (Art. 9 in preamble) and the Constitution of 2005 should be interpreted in the light of 
Arusha
113. Interestingly enough, the ruling party’s actions demonstrate ignorance to 
Arusha’s conditions114. 
The Commission 11 members were appointed on 3 December 2014 by Burundian National 
Assembly, but opposition boycotted the vote. The opposition leader Charles Nditije 
(UPRONA) commented the event:  
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We wanted to protest against setting up this TRC, which only reflects the 
wishes of the ruling CNDD-FDD and ignores the element of justice contained 
in the Arusha peace accords [...]. Normally it takes two to have reconciliation. 
One side cannot force the other to hand out a pardon [...] truth and 
reconciliation cannot happen without justice
115
.  
The Conference of Catholic Bishops has joined the many stakeholders (e.g. civil society 
organisations and several opposition parties) who protest and criticise the process of 
establishing TJ mechanisms, especially the lack of consultations and actual possibility to 
participate as well as failure to accommodate the recommendation from the National 
Consultations 2009 to appoint a civil society representative as one Commissioner
116
. 
Human rights activist Pacifique Nininahazwe states very accurately that the involvement of 
the CNDD-FDD in the conflict is widely known among Burundians and that is completely 
abnormal that the ruling party can, without external consultations, decide reconciliation 
matters. He also adds that “the law does not mention anything related to justice or sanctions 
against those who have committed serious human rights violations; and the vetting 
mechanism has been excluded”.117 Impunity Watch adds when discussing the final draft of 
the bill: “The intentions of the government to use the process as a way to guarantee 
amnesty for crimes under international law and institutionalise a process of pardon has now 
apparently crystallised”.118 Likelihood that the perpetrators having some affiliation with the 
ruling party will go unpunished is present. The even more serious prospect is how the law 
will be abused against the political opposition and Tutsi ethnic group. The genocides and 
murders took place for over 40 years, so there are many “war criminals” and “accomplices” 
to selectively choose from for statistical purposes and the government is known to 
discriminate against the Tutsis daily already without such a powerful tool as the newly 
passed TRC bill. 
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Based on many sources, I can surely state that Burundi’s daily reality is clouded by 
targeted killings, impunity, human rights violations, rising political tensions, armed 
banditry and lack of the rule of law
119
. As the TJ process is under the control of 
predominately Hutu political party, who has now appointed the Commission members it 
can trust to deliver the expected results, the chances that victims and witnesses dare to 
speak out their truth that doesn’t match the expectation of the ruling party are relatively 
minimal. Considering that different ethnic groups in Burundi describe very differently how 
the atrocities took place and there is no experienced neutral mediator present, the process of 
establishing a common truth that would be acceptable to both ethnic groups, will be very 
challenging. 
On 19 January 2015, the Secretary General of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) presented 
a report to provide an overview of UN’s field missions’ accomplishments in Burundi since 
1993
120
. Despite presenting a very real picture of rising political tensions before the 
elections in June 2015 that can lead to a new cycle of violence and terminate the fragile 
negative peace, BNUB has ended its mission by 31 December 2014 and handed over the 
guardian position to the United Nations country team, which mainly focuses on 
development issues, and the United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi 
(MENUB). 
Several sources mention that the conflict in Burundi has shifted from being ethnical to 
being political and consider this to be a success
121
. The question to ponder over is what 
exactly qualifies as a success here: signing Arusha Agreement or actually seeing the 
fulfillment of the set goals, in this case positive peace and social reconciliation? As per 
today, qualifying the situation as “success” seems to be a strong over-statement. Be it as it 
may, the stakes of the elections in June 2015 are very high. Seger provides a reason for 
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that: “Today in the absence of a valid alternative in the private sector, political power all 
too often amounts to economic power”122. So despite a possible shift in a nature of conflict, 
the danger of unrest is just as imminent and devastating for ordinary Burundians. 
NORDEM report states that “Burundi has returned to a pattern where the state is dominated 
by narrow elite. A new ruling elite, linked to the CNDD-FDD, has replaced the pre-conflict 
Tutsi elite”123 and adds that the only way for the opposition to be able to exercise any 
influence in the National Assembly in the light of current power-sharing arrangement, is to 
get minimum 1/3 of seats in the National Assembly at the 2015 elections
124
. 
The first signs of trouble related to the electoral processes have already been registered. 
BNUB’s report from January 2015 mentions the irregularities in the voter registration 
process and fraudulent distribution of national identity cards selectively to CNDD-FDD 
supporters and also to minors below the voting age, restrictive laws regarding the political 
space as well as intimidation, harassment and political violence towards the opposition and 
the civil society
125
. 
Seger describes in his report how “it would take only little for Burundi to make the last 
effort towards irreversible peace and consolidation and grow into a model case for a 
successful post-conflict transition”126, mentioning truly inclusive dialogue, opening up the 
political space to ensure basic liberties, like freedom of speech and assembly, and 
promoting activities of human rights defenders as possible solutions. I will introduce my 
recommendations in Chapter 4. 
3.4 Why TRC now? 
Almost 15 years after the signing of Arusha Agreement, the TRC, one of the TJ 
mechanisms mentioned in the Agreement, is being launched. At the face value, these are 
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good news. 15 years is a time for a whole new generation of Burundians to grow up, live 
with and elate to versions of truths about the horrific 50 years history of mass atrocities 
being discussed, naturally subjectively, around the dinner tables. The question, however, 
still remains: why now? 
3.4.1 Wish to stay in power 
The reasons for setting up the TRC in Burundi are in my opinion political. President’s 
second term is running out and every effort is made now to prolong the term for another 
five years. This would be in conflict with Arusha Agreement as well as current 
Constitution’s terms. Political tensions are rising because the ruling party has been pushing 
towards the change in the Constitution to allow the President’s third term, failing with only 
one vote. The reason is relevant: the President has not managed to establish locally and 
internationally accepted amnesty for the war crimes before 2005, so by leaving the office, 
he loses control over the TJ process and related decisions. 
Burundi’s TJ will very likely be justice of the ruling party. CNDD-FDD didn’t win the civil 
war, but through diplomacy and politics, the former guerillas have fought and will continue 
to fight, with legal as well as unfair and unethical means, for their position in Burundi’s 
politics to decide what truth will be recorded as common history.  
The third-term related tensions have woken the international community as they can be 
detrimental to the peace in Burundi. CNDD-FDD has now adopted a “controversial 
interpretation of the constitutions” claiming that the constitution “provides for two terms by 
universal suffrage”, thus requiring that people elect him two times127. In 2005 Nkururziza 
was appointed by the National Assembly, thus after CNDD-FDD’s considerations the first 
five years do not count. This interpretation has been condemned by ambassador of the 
European Union in Burundi, Patrick Spirlet, who encourages the government of Burundi to 
respect the Constitution and Arusha Agreement providing for limited 10 years in power for 
                                                 
 
127
 NORDEM Special Report 2015, pages 45-46. 
 40 
a state leader to avoid the deterioration of the political climate
128
, as well as the US special 
envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Russel 
Feingold, who insisted that Burundi respect the contents and spirit of Arusha Agreement in 
terms of the presidential elections and stated that “while some constitutional provisions 
were open to interpretation, the accord is clear that no president should govern for more 
than two terms”129. 
Charles Nditije, a former Chairman of an influential opposition party UPRONA, cites 
Article 103 of the Constitution: “The mandate of the President of the Republic debuts on 
the day of his taking of the oath and ends when his successor enters into his functions”130. 
In addition, Paul R. Seger, the Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission- Burundi 
Configuration, reports that “the positions of various opposition parties have radicalized on 
this issue…they would interpret the eventual announcement of a third term as a coup d’etat 
further raising the stakes the question already engenders”131. Nditije, Agathon Rwasa, 
former Chairman of political party FNL, and 6 other political parties have now formed a 
political coalition to increase their influence in the election process in 2015
132
. To prevent 
the running of known opposition leaders as a president candidate, the Supreme Court 
spokesperson announced  on 20 August 2014 that “all presidential candidates in the 2015 
elections would have to provide [...] a document certifying that there are no pending 
lawsuits against them”, while the ruling party fabricates alleged claims and lawsuits against 
the potential President candidates in 2015 elections posing the greatest risk to the current 
President, to eliminate them formally from the electoral race
133
. 
The response from the President’s spokesperson Willy Nyamitwe is that “anyone seeking 
to spark protests would face the law [...] whoever calls on people to take on the streets[...] 
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will be considered a troublemaker and will be treated as such”134. Laurent Kavakure, 
Foreign Minister, commented as follows: “It is true that Arusha Agreement for us is a 
historic agreement [...] but we do not regard it as a Bible”135. 
The elections are budgeted to cost over USD 60,5 million, covered largely by the 
international community
136
. However, some contributing partners have decided to make 
their second payments conditional, thus taking a two-step approach. Also, IMF has 
critisised the government’s decision to budget 18% of its revenues for the elections as this 
could jeopardise “the implementation of important reform projects”137.  
Ruling party’s decision from April 2015 to nominate Nkurunziza for the third term, despite 
the many warnings from the influential international actors, demonstrates clearly how 
personal interests are prioritised over those of the population. Instead of focusing on 
national reconciliation, the ruling party risks the fragile peace for personal agendas. 
Ordinary people have come to the streets in May 2015 to demand the withdrawal of 
Nkurunziza’s candidacy because, in practice, once Nkurunziza is a President candidate for 
the ruling party, he has just as well as already won. 
3.4.2 Burundi needs international legitimacy 
Burundi needs international legitimacy due to its dependency on foreign aid. So at least on 
the paper the TJ process must be started. Vandeginste describes accurately that  
the prospect of full funding through the donor basket fund is surely an 
important carrot. [...] Furthermore, the UN’s request that the prosecutor of a 
special tribunal must be fully independent does not mean much if [...] the 
establishment of the tribunal is again delayed for a number of years. In other 
words, the expected (financial and legitimacy) benefits of establishing the TRC 
clearly exceed the (limited) costs or risks involved for the government
138
. 
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The good news is, however, that despite the real rhetorical reasons, the norms that can, 
once the time is right, be beneficial for the opposition and civil society to invoke, are part 
of the national legislation and supported by the international human rights law and 
international criminal law obligations that Burundi has accepted. Ordinary people are 
“waking”, and the situation can become critical for the oppressive regime very fast. 
3.4.3 Gains are bigger than risks 
International interest for the actual TJ process seems to be lacking. UN has been supporting 
the maintenance of peace and security in the region and the international community was 
very involved in the peace process until the elections in 2005, but has been more moderate 
after actual ceasing of armed conflict and the former military groups registering themselves 
as political parties and entering politics. Vandeginste describes how “Burundi’s 
international partners [...] deliberately delayed the establishment [of TJ mechanisms] until 
they deemed the conditions more conducive. The country’s political elite soon realized that 
the UN had no intention of pushing for the mechanisms”, at least not with any urgency139. 
The timing of setting up TJ mechanism(s) has influenced the outcome of TJ so far. If the 
mechanisms had been set up before the first elections took place in 2005, the perpetrators 
could have been removed from politics. As the elections took place first, those who likely 
would have been tried in the tribunals are currently passing legislation and policies that 
favor their own status.   
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4 Way forward to promote the achievements and address the 
shortcomings in the implementation of Arusha Agreement. 
This chapter aims at answering the second part of the research question, namely how to 
promote the achievements and address the shortcomings in the implementation of Arusha 
Agreement, and coming up with recommendations for TJ and development that would fit 
the legal, economic and social context of Burundi in 2015 and would serve the interests of 
ordinary Burundians. Some of the recommendations were already included into Arusha 
Agreement, some have been proposed in general terms by the UN, and some will be 
proposed by me. In addition, this chapter addresses the role of the international community 
and its R2P in the light of 2015 elections. 
Based on the analysis in Chapter 3, I can conclude that the achievements of TJ process in 
Burundi are related to implementation of power-sharing provisions in Arusha Agreement. 
Namely, two rounds of relatively democratic elections have been held, with the third one 
taking place in May 2015. The prevalence of “negative peace” for almost a decade is also 
an achievement. International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) has stated already in 2008, 
however, that the Burundi’s case has demonstrated that the power-sharing conditions for 
the Constitution may not be enough to guarantee political elite cooperation, as is the case 
now in 2015 when the divided political opposition struggles to even influence, not surely 
control, the coalition government
140
.  
TJ related activities beyond political power-sharing are characterised by delays and 
postponements. The mandate and likely activities of the TRC from 2015 onwards are in the 
very starting phase and are being already heavily critisised by both the local and 
international stakeholders. Therefore, I will develop a list of suggestions for the way 
forward in spring 2015 as if the TJ process has not been started at all. The reason for such 
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decision is that the root-causes for the conflict identified in Arusha Agreement have not 
been dealt with and the struggle for power and economic resources is still the motivation 
behind the “reforms” by the Burundi government. In addition, such starting point also gives 
me an opportunity to refer to “lessons learned” from other states’ TJ, especially truth-
telling, attempts that might be useful for Burundi’s process. 
So, first, I will look at the categories of proposed recommendations to dealing with the root 
causes of the conflict in Burundi described in Arusha Agreement Protocol I Chapter II, and 
create a so-called baseline before the start of the possible implementation. Second, I will 
make a substantive decision about the focus on TJ, namely justice vs reconciliation.  Third, 
I will also look at indicators that would be useful in predicting the success of TJ process, in 
the light of possible suggestions in Burundi. And finally, I will make several 
recommendations how I see that the TJ process should be developed in Burundi, keeping 
the focus on the two following aspects: that the suggestions would benefit an ordinary 
Burundian, and that the suggestion would help prevent the re-occurrence of atrocities. 
4.1 Identified solutions in Arusha Agreement 
The root causes for the conflict were identified in Protocol I Article 4 of Arusha 
Agreement: (a) The conflict is fundamentally political, with extremely important ethnic 
dimensions; (b) It stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in 
power. 
Protocol I Chapter 2 proposed solutions to overcome the root causes and guide the society 
towards the reconciliation. The following groupings of solutions can be identified: (1) 
Political: new constitution, separation of powers, new electoral law, prevention of coups 
d’etat; (2) Related to genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity; (3) Related 
to exclusion; (4) Related to social services; (5) Related to cultural principles and measures; 
(6) Related to national reconciliation. 
Political solutions have been more or less been dealt with through power-sharing 
arrangements and following legislation amendments, and will thus not be addressed by me.  
 45 
Solutions related to genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity, included both 
political and justice measures
141
. Political principles and measures were to include, for 
example, combating impunity of crimes, implementation of a vast awareness and 
educational programme for national peace, unity and reconciliation, establishment of a 
national observatory for the prevention and eradiction of genocide, war crimes and other 
crimes against humanity, erection of a national monument in memory of all victims of 
genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity, bearing the words «NEVER 
AGAIN», institution of a national day of remembrance for victims of genocide, war crimes 
and other crimes against humanity, and taking of measures that would facilitate the 
identification of mass graves and ensure a dignified burial for the victims. Principles and 
measures in the area of justice were to include requesting the UN Security Council of an 
International Judicial Commission of Inquiry, and requesting the establishment by the UN 
Security Council of an international criminal tribunal. The political principles and measures 
have not been fulfilled and require local political will for implementation.  
As a response to the principles and measures in the area of justice, in 2004 UN sent a 
mission to Burundi to assess “the advisability and feasibility of establishing an 
international judicial commission of inquiry for Burundi”.142 The final report, published in 
March 2005, is known as Kalomoh report
143
. In short, it criticised the adopted plan for the 
national TRC and suggested a combined version of the national TRC and the international 
judicial commission of inquiry, where out of 5 commissioners three would be international. 
The report also suggested establishing a Special Chamber within the Burundian court 
system (section 61) as opposed to the international tribunal located outside the country, or 
Special Court that is not part of the national legal system, with mixed composition of 
judges and an international prosecutor (section 65), criticizing highly the independence and 
capacity of the national legal system in Burundi (section 52). The Kalomoh report 
suggestions were formulated in the SC Resolution1606 (20 June 2005). As Vandeginste 
                                                 
 
141
 Arusha Agreement, Protocol I, Chapter II, Article 6 
142
 S/2004/72 
143
 S/2005/158 
 46 
notes, both parties understood through the negotiations that the Special Chamber should be 
replaced by a separate Special Tribunal to avoid the government control
144
. 
The likelihood that an international criminal tribunal will be set up after such a long time is, 
in my opinion, close to zero. Would the international interest have been there, would the 
tribunal have been established at the same time, and maybe even in a combined manner, 
with the ICTR. Now, however, the work of the ICTR is being finished, with some appeal 
cases still pending. Another widely spread criticism is that functioning of the international 
tribunals has considerable costs per person convicted
145
. The third reason is the lack of 
local political will in Burundi for international interference in matters that can have serious 
ramifications on the political elite. 
Thus as both the political and justice area measures actually require, for successful 
implementation, a change in the political landscape in Burundi and an enormous shift in the 
interest of the international community to push for these measures, I will not elaborate 
more on them in this thesis and suggest that they should be put on hold, until the 
circumstances are more favorable. 
Therefore, I will make a substantive decision to focus the rest of this Chapter on 
suggestions related to implementation of solutions from Arusha Agreement related to (1) 
National reconciliation, including promoting cultural principles and measures; and (2) 
Exclusion from (or access to) public administration services, education, justice, economy 
and resources and social services.  
4.2 Focus on recommendations related to national reconciliation 
Arusha Agreement Protocol IV Chapter II regulates political reconstruction in Burundi and 
mentions national reconciliation programme as one of the measures, besides strengthening 
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civil society and independent media, reforming the judicial system and promoting the 
culture of peace and human rights. The first careful step taken by the government of 
Burundi in 2014, 14 years after signing of Arusha Agreement, was establishing the TRC 
and appointing Commission members (see Chapter 3 for details).  
Secretary-General of the United Nations defines TRC as “a critical mechanism to further 
peace consolidation, reconciliation and development” with precondition that “the 
mechanism be fully owned by the population, their representatives and civil society at 
large”146. In addition, UN Security Council emphasises that the established TJ mechanisms 
must be “credible and consensual”147 and comply with international standards148. 
Interestingly enough, the lack of promoting “home-grown solutions to the conflict” and 
overshadowing the peace process are exactly the things that PRIO criticises the 
international and regional actors in Burundi’s case for149. To encourage the international 
community to set demands, Taylor states explicitly that insisting that the law for TRC 
guarantees independence, impartiality, and popular participation is not the same as 
breaching Burundi’s national sovereignty, but rather a way to insist on respect for basic 
democratic principles and rights
150
. 
The Secretary-General of BNUB, while expressing concern that the TRC Commission 
establishment has been tainted with boycotts and not having full support of all relevant 
stakeholders, cautions that a “faulty transitional justice process is more likely to harm than 
heal” as it reopens wounds instead of creating an opportunity for building a common 
future
151
. So UN cannot be, in 2014 and 2015, be accused of not criticizing the Government 
of Burundi, yet their criticism should also have motivating consequences, should the result 
not meet the international standards and fulfill expectations. 
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Expectations related to TJ can be measured by the indicators established in the UN Burundi 
Joint Transition Plan: 
 Establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission in line with the 2009 
national consultations, the work of the technical committee of 2011, 
international standards and applicable legal instruments; 
 Establishment of a special tribunal in line with the 2009 national 
consultations, the work of the technical committee of 2011, international 
standards and applicable legal instruments; 
 Existence of a follow-up mechanism for the implementation of 
recommendations of a truth and reconciliation commission; 
 Increasing ability of the political leadership to bring about reconciliation 
between the victims and perpetrators of past crimes; 
 Increasing level of satisfaction with the transitional justice process; 
 Increasing percentage of the population believing that reconciliation has been 
achieved. 152 
The mandate of TRC was described in Chapter 3. This has also been criticised. For 
example, UN Peacebuilding Commission expressed the overall concern about the TRC 
Commission was that the focus would be on “forgiveness at the expense of constructing 
memory and fighting impunity”.153 Taylor suggested clearly a considerable reassessment of 
TRC’s mandate and adoption of a localised approach, not necessarily tested elsewhere154. 
Realistically, the mandate will not be changed. What still can be changed is how much 
effort will be put into every section of the mandate to follow it through and guarantee a 
successful process that would be acceptable to the population at large. Hazan’s indicators 
can be of assistance here (below).
155
 
Indicators for truth commission: 
1. Production of “truth” (what kind of truth will be produced: factual, personal or 
social/dialogical truth; depends largely on the mandate of TRC) 
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2. Presentation of “truth” (minimalistic vs broad coverage. Truth vs forgiveness) 
3. Recommendations for institutional reforms and implementation (whether and to 
what extent are they implemented) 
Common indicators: 
4. The therapeutic impact (restoring victims’ and survivors’ dignity, physical and 
psychological risks involved in testifying, re-traumatization) 
5. The effectiveness of public apologies (insincere, diplomatic tool, who are the 
real target groups) 
6. The effectiveness of reparations (finances available, moral issues with 
accepting money) 
7. The process of building a common narrative (practical activities: opening 
archives, museums, memorials, re-writing textbooks, etc.; and social 
reconstruction: re-humanisation, re-ritualisation, etc.; creating a symbolic 
bonding system for future generations). 
4.2.1 Promoting the principles and use of Bushingantahe as an accepted and 
understood source of reconciliation and conflict resolution. 
Arusha Agreement Chapter 1 Article 1 (2) refers to Bushingantahe as a factor promoting 
cohesion. Ingelære and Kohlhagen concluded based on an extensive fieldwork that the 
institution is in fact accepted by both ethnic groups and did not find evidence of ethnic 
prejudice at local level
156
. They therefore proposed, based on numerous interviews with 
Burundians, that Bushingantahe principles, even though possibly not typical TJ source or 
mechanism, must be part of the process of dealing with the past and living together again. 
For example,  
by accepting discourse – talking – as a way of truth telling; by using moral 
condemnation as a form of accountability; by judges or commissioners being 
chosen primarily based on their moral authority instead of their legal 
competence; and by understanding that the sharing of food and drink will be 
paramount to achieving reconciliation in any aspect of the transitional justice 
process and in any operationalization of a transitional justice mechanism
157
.  
Authors also suggested that the globally accepted TJ principles could operate at the macro 
level of Burundian society. The UNDP introduces Bashingantahe as a peaceful resolution 
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to land and family disputes via mediation and reconciliation, promoting social cohesion and 
peaceful conflict resolution
158
. 
4.2.2 Truth-telling experiences from other countries 
As the TRC functioning is still at the very beginning, experiences from other countries 
should be learned from and taken into consideration by those who plan the reconciliation 
strategy for Burundi.  
When describing the work of TRC in Democratic Republic of Congo, Davis notes that 
despite the TRC’s mandate being truth-seeking and reconciliation, the fact that the 
executive committee represented the interests of the belligerent parties and that the public 
at large was not involved, undermined TRC’s credibility and prevented the commission 
from contributing to truth-seeking.
159
  
Hansen describes the truth-telling in Kenya as a process captured by the elite, who gained 
power via peace agreement, and who had “no real commitment at the level of the political 
leadership to establish a credible truth-seeking process”160. He adds that the TRC (TJRC in 
Kenya) was under-funded, the public was not properly involved nor informed, for example 
according to one survey ca 23% of the victims never heard of the commission, thus a strong 
and independent truth commission never realised in practice. Hansen’s concluded that 
“manipulation of history and ethnicity has proven a central method for politicians to 
mobilise support, a strong and independent TJRC is likely to have been seen as a danger 
since it could have helped overcome ethnic myths and create a shared national 
narrative”161. 
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Taylor uses the South African truth-seeking process where the limited participation of 
significant groups, for example military and white population, limited investigation of 
those in power, as a warning for Burundi where the local truths are expected to be 
uncovered, and those holding power can simply refuse to participate, should it be 
voluntary
162
. He also mentions that Burundians can fear preferential treatment to certain 
regions in the country as the mandate is enormous many communities have been 
affected
163
. 
Ngoga has written that the important contribution with the establishment of ICTR was that 
it became a legal, not only political, acknowledgement that genocide happened and this fact 
has become internationally accepted. The guilty verdicts have promoted political stability 
as genocide suspects were removed from the politics and that helped limit the culture of 
impunity
164
. Lemarchand demonstrates how Rwanda experience can also be interpreted in 
different ways as, from one side, Gacaca trials were a unique way towards TJ while, on the 
other, unifying official memory and creating a new ethnicity Banyarwanda instead of the 
Hutu and the Tutsi seems to be creating manipulated, enforced and thwarted memories
165
. 
When analyzing those lessons, and comparing them with the expectations of Burundians 
from the National Consultations, it seems very possible that the choices of the ruling party 
for TRC today are following the examples, and failures, from cases presented above, and 
will fail to fulfill the expectations. Without local political will, it is difficult to change the 
course, unless the international community will start using their leverage consistently (see 
also recommendation 3 under section 4.3.3).  
Another way to use the visual interest of the ruling party to start the TJ process would be to 
use that momentum to accomplish something that would benefit the society in a long-run. 
Here I will make a reference to section 4.4. (IT solutions, outreach, information). 
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4.3 Focus on recommendations related to exclusion from education, justice 
and resources. 
Economic development and employment have a crucial role in peacebuilding and recovery 
and “increased access to justice through legal aid and rights awareness can also protect the 
interests of small-scale landholders, traders and merchants from elite predation”166.  
However, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, the statistics for the socio-economic realities for 
Burundi have not improved during the 15 years since the signing of Arusha Agreement. For 
the first, lack of considerable private sector as employment alternative turns public sector 
into main employer to the population. Exclusion from the employment market and services 
due to lack of connections to the ruling party or not preferred ethnic group constitutes a 
serious social problem
167
. 
Population’s access to information is very limited. It starts with the fact that almost half of 
those enrolled to primary school do not graduate and only 28% of those who could enroll to 
secondary schools
168
. Human rights related literature, education and knowledge, as well as 
relevant information online, due to extremely limited access to computers, electricity and 
internet, are simply not available and this makes the majority of population easy to 
manipulate. 
Population’s access to legal aid and fair trials is limited. Again, it starts with being aware of 
one’s rights. Yet, the problems run deeper because homes, documents and photos could 
have been burnt, witnesses could have been killed or intimidated and after having to flee to 
safer areas, often at multiple occasions, has caused the evidence held by ordinary people 
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simply being lost. In addition, lawyers who could provide legal aid to victims of state abuse 
are also subjects to intimidations and harassment. 
4.3.1 Recommendation 1: following up the Transition Plan Burundi 2014, Priority 
area 5: social and economic development 
The benchmark established in the Transition Plan is “improving living standards of the 
population, delivery of basic services to the most vulnerable and conditions for economic 
recovery” 169. 
This area is covered by development programmes in the framework of United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Main donors and partners for both priority 
areas are Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, USA, EU and the African 
Union
170
. 
4.3.2 Recommendation 2: setting focus on development programmes in Burundi 
through bilateral help (example Norway) 
The Norwegian Government has concluded a white paper on human rights in Norway’s 
foreign and development policy, called "Opportunities for All: Human Rights in Norway’s 
Foreign Policy and Development Cooperation", placing commitment to human rights to the 
heart of Norway’s foreign and development policy171.  The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) enlisted priorities are, among others: 
[...] high priority to education in its development policy, with a particular focus 
on girls, children with disabilities, the poorest children, and children in crisis 
and conflicts[;] [...] 
setting clear requirements for the recipients of Norwegian aid as regards their 
willingness to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and 
making it clear that serious violations of human rights or an unwillingness to 
comply with human rights obligations will have consequences for further 
cooperation; [...] 
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strengthening efforts to protect human rights defenders and promoting a strong 
and independent civil society;  
drawing up a strategy for the promotion of freedom of expression and 
independent media in foreign policy and development cooperation
172
.  
These priorities match in fact exactly the exclusion solutions’ requirements from Arusha 
Agreement. MFA has identified the target countries for bilateral support and unfortunately 
Burundi is not on that list, differently from Tanzania, South Sudan and Uganda. In 2013, 
Norway sent NOK 80,9 million to Burundi
173
. Burundi, on the other hand, could and 
should, in my opinion, be on the priority list based on the very low results on all possible 
indexes, yet as a very small land where ca 10 million people live compactly on 28 000 km², 
properly targeted bilateral as well as multilateral aid can produce effective results and 
noticeable change in a relatively short period. 
4.3.3 Recommendation 3: making ODA conditional: human rights based approach 
(HRBA) and result-based management (RBM) 
Due to Burundi’s dependency on ODA, international community has considerable leverage 
which needs to be used consistently and strictly. “Naming and shaming” and pointing at 
failures to comply with international standards and/or fulfill made promised and 
commitments should be openly addressed, and if necessary punished to motivate. 
As an example, BTI describes in its report how the donor community granted the 
Burundian government $2.5 billion in 2012, which was nearly twice as much as the ruling 
elite expected, although the concerns about the human rights abuses by security organs and 
the intimidation and harassment of opposition members were not answered nor seriously 
addressed
174. Seger’s example how he offered to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
Burundi, after a successful elections, to focus cooperation with Peace Building 
Commission on socio-economic development and attracting private investments to 
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Burundi, to which the Minister answered that “his Government has not yet taken a decision 
on the future cooperation with the PBC, but would certainly appreciate the elaboration of a 
concept note”, shows that today the ruling party in Burundi has lost clear understanding 
who makes the rules
175
. 
Another way to motivate the governments for cooperation was proposed by Arjun 
Sengupta who suggested a “human-rights based approach” to the World Bank and IMF, 
meaning that they should make their poverty reduction programmes open-ended, thus funds 
being available only if human rights standards have been made part of strategies
176
. As I 
have mentioned before, Burundi’s PRSPII included those expected standards, so we should 
take one step further and include result-based management (RBM) model to measure 
results and withhold next payments should the results and reporting not meet the expected 
level and criteria
177
. 
In addition, government members and elite should be subject to tax reviews to establish the 
sources of their increasing wealth and to find ways to gap the growing inequalities. This is 
connected to the amount of money that is provided in cash-grants and the corruption level 
established by reliable indexes in Chapter 1. The unaltered socio-economic statistics 
suggest that the ODA in today’s format does not benefit the ordinary people in Burundi. 
4.3.4 Recommendation 4: focusing on economic reforms 
Development economist Jeffrey Sachs has identified the “Big Five” development 
interventions: 
1. Boosting agricultural performance 
2. Improving basic health 
3. Investments in education 
4. Improving power, technology and communications 
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5. Access to clean drinking water and proper sanitation178 
His idea was to set up the so-called “millenium villages” where such conditions were 
met
179
. The cost for setting up infrastructure for one village of 5000 people costs 
approximately $350,000 and people can learn to support themselves sustainably, thus 
decreasing their poverty over the period of time. Maathai says that, for example, in Kenya, 
to provide the Big Five to all those who need them would cost about 1,5billion US dollars 
per year
180
. As Burundi is much smaller, the costs there would be lower. 
4.3.5 Recommendation 5: activating the “poor vote”  
Activating the “poor vote” is a long-term project. Banik describes how the poor and the 
vulnerable groups, for example women, in developing countries often do not participate in 
political processes and how much influence they could have if they could or knew how to 
vote collectively to emphasise their needs and hold the leaders accountable
181
. The focus of 
this recommendation must be on education programmes. This would, in a long-run, initiate 
the demands for democratic processes and accountability in the country. As a result TJ 
process might become realistic again after the political scene in Burundi has changed. 
Clarke also assessed that the main elements missing in Sub-Saharan Africa when compared 
to Arab Spring and mobilizing opposition are literacy and access to technology as those 
make it possible to read relevant information, express own views, create strategies and 
mobilise global interest
182
. 
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4.4 Other recommendations 
4.4.1 Recommendation 6: creating a documentation center  
Using the current Government’s willingness to start the TJ process via TRC, international 
pressure is necessary to get the government to really dedicate itself to creating common 
history. My suggestion is the creation of a documentation center. As described above, the 
atrocities have taken place over five decades, the amounts is victims is big, the number of 
refugees and internally displaced people is close to a million. A lot of evidence owned by 
people has already been lost. The generation of adults who experienced the genocides and 
related atrocities is getting old and dying, literally taking their witness testimonies with 
them to grave. Burundi has an oral tradition, related to low literacy rate and talking as a 
form of socializing. Should one day interest to investigate the committed atrocities arise, 
will gathering all the evidence be problematic. 
The goal would be to, firstly, cooperate with the local civil society organisations that might 
already have started gathering such documentation and witness statements and 
systematically collect and, most importantly, preserve the documentation available, 
preferably in servers outside Burundi. The second aim should be to approach as many 
people as possible, in different regions and from different ethnic groups, to get hold on 
documentation they might have, but in the case of Burundi, to mainly record as many 
witness statements with details and names as possible. The next step would be insert the 
collected data into a tailored database, digitalise, analyse and tag information available, 
creating patterns to re-create possible events and eliminating false statements as compared 
to majority statements and probabilities. Such statistical data would help identify killed and 
missing persons, joint graves, perpetrators in the military, local authorities as well as 
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among guerillas, and give a common understanding with guaranteed confidentiality to 
witnesses as to what has happened in Burundi throughout the last 50 years
183
.  
Even though there amount of victims, relatives and witnesses among the population in 
Burundi is huge, there are some groups that could provide more information than others, 
when approached. For example, the President and other leading politicians now and then, 
National Forces (army, police), local authorities, school headmasters of that time, church 
leaders, SOS villages’ leaders of that time, etc.. The availability of written official orders is, 
of course, not certain. 
Technological possibilities could also be used to make attendance for truth-telling more 
available to ordinary Burundians. For example, let witnesses give testimonies via media 
without having to travel great distances, as physical participation might be difficult to many 
due to limited infrastructure as well as necessity to work for living near home daily. 
Additionally, technology must be used to inform the population about TRC, its mandate, 
related processes and hearings, and, most importantly, developments and results. 
4.4.2 Recommendation 7: taking a regional approach 
Burundi is part of the Great Lakes region and instability in one country definitely affects 
the others. For different reasons mentioned above, Burundi has not been able to attract 
enough international attention to its situation, something that cannot be said about 
Burundi’s closest neighbors Rwanda and Tanzania. For example, in 2008, Rwanda and 
Tanzania were selected with 7 other countries to become pilot countries for the UN reform 
known as "Delivering as One" or "One UN"
184
. Burundi should be added to this pilot as 
soon as possible.  
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My suggestion thus is that what is done with Rwanda and Tanzania should naturally, 
almost automatically, include Burundi as the leaders there are currently unable and 
unwilling to think in Burundi’s best interest per today themselves.  
4.4.3 Recommendation 8: preventing re-occurrence of atrocities 
In 2014, BTI wrote: “A further escalation of the political crisis could effectively mean a 
relapse into an authoritarian and exclusionary political system similar to the prewar 
configuration and seriously endanger the hard-won peace. This looming negative scenario 
ought to be actively addressed by Burundi’s sub-regional neighbors and the wider 
international community”185. 
The political tensions from 2014 and 2015 have now activated the international community 
a little, yet specific actions are not being taken yet, even though the methodology and 
know-how has been developed earlier and is available. For example, UN Secretary-General 
report A/68/947-S/2014/449 from 11 July 2014 suggests 3 methods how the international 
community could contribute to preventing states from falling into cycles of violence and 
atrocities: (1) encouragement; (2) capacity building; (3) protection assistance.  
UN should take its peacekeeping obligation seriously and take preventive measures before 
the upcoming elections in Burundi in June 2015 to avoid next internal armed conflict. 
Solution suggestion would thus be to allocate resources in the light of R2P’s pillar II 
assistance. And, in the case of Burundi, if the violator is the state itself, the focus should be 
shifted to supporting civil society and independent media, keeping international attention 
focused on Burundi and punishing and isolating the perpetrators
186
. 
Another recommendation could be based on Rwanda’s experience with peace-building, 
attempting to create lasting peace by transforming currently interest-related nation-wide 
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peacebuilding projects into bottom-up local initiatives that understand and, therefore, could 
benefit people in local communities
187
. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I will conclude, in the form of answering the research question, what have 
been the successes and shortcomings of Arusha Agreement implementation so far and how 
such implementation has impacted the TJ process and population in general. I will also 
summarise my recommendations related to TJ, reconciliation and truth-telling as well as 
development in general. 
Burundi has not been able to make considerable progress in development nor TJ since 
signing of Arusha Agreement in 2000. Factors that seem to contribute most are local 
political elite’s subjective preferences, interests and policies and the limited international 
community interest and engagement in a very small land-locked country lacking significant 
natural resources. I have demonstrated how Burundi’s development as well as political 
stability influence the Great Lakes region as a whole and how the reforms and programmes 
driven in neighboring countries should be given a regional scope to almost automatically 
include and,  as a result, benefit Burundi. 
Based on my analysis in chapter 3, I can conclude that the successes of Arusha Agreement 
implementation are the end of the civil war in 2005, with last guerilla groups terminating 
their activities in 2008, the maintenance of negative peace, the power-sharing 
arrangements, the organizing of two sets of relatively democratic elections with the third 
round taking place in May 2015, and the adoption of a new Constitution in 2005 which 
includes many important references to international human rights law treaties that will have 
more practical significance once the political climate has improved and the political elite 
replaced in the country. 
The shortcoming of Arusha Agreement implementation are related to the failure of the 
political elite in Burundi to address the root causes of the genocides and related atrocities 
throughout the last 50 years, namely, as established in Arusha Agreement Protocol I Article 
4, that the conflict is fundamentally political with extremely important ethnic dimensions 
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and the it stems from a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power, 
as the political power in Burundi equals economic power and access to resources. By 
failing to address the solutions from Arusha Agreement related to national reconciliation 
and creation of common understanding of the history, exclusion from education, justice, 
social services, employment and development, and making strategic choices for economic 
reforms to free the country, at least in long-term perspective, from dependency on ODA, 
will positive peace not only remain unattainable in Burundi, but the country is in risk of 
falling back into renewed cycles of violence. 
TJ in Burundi has almost not started at the time of writing this thesis, 15 years after signing 
of Arusha Agreement. The ruling party is a former guerilla group whose members of that 
time actively participated in the civil war in the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s and 
allegedly committed serious war crimes and crimes against humanity. The lack of vetting 
clauses in Arusha Agreement allowed them to come to power via peace-agreement in 2005, 
provide temporary immunities to those related to the ruling party and other armed groups 
and basically maneuvering the take control of all three branches of the government to 
dominate the direction that TJ in Burundi is taking. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, scholars as well as international community have 
acknowledged widely now that the setting up of TRC as an initial TJ mechanism in 
Burundi is also a political maneuver, that the TRC as established today is not independent, 
that the truth-telling will be done at the expense of accountability and justice and by the 
rules acceptable and favorable to the ruling party, and will not, as a result,  serve the needs, 
expectations and interests of the population at large nor fulfill the goals related to 
reconciliation. 
Chapter 4 was dedicated to the recommendations for possible solutions how to make TJ 
process meaningful for the population, following largely the framework provided for in 
Arusha Agreement. In the beginning of the chapter, I took a substantive decision to not 
discuss judicial and political solutions as they require local political will and engagement 
that, due to conflict of interests, is not present today.  
 63 
Instead, I focused on recommendations related to national reconciliation, looking at truth-
telling as a most realistic option at hand. I also combined the solution with expectations of 
Burundians expressed at National Consultations in 2009 and 2010 and how locals view 
Bushingantahe as a reliable and understandable traditional non-judicial conflict resolution 
method until today. As access to resources has been the root cause for the conflict for 
decades, solutions related to development, economic reforms, education and fighting 
poverty were naturally included. As Burundi is a compact country, a coordinated and 
consistent effort via bilateral and multilateral aid can produce relatively fast and 
measurable results and effects in that country, and would, in addition, definitely help to 
prevent re-occurrence of atrocities. 
Another recommendation that can have a significant impact on reconciliation and would 
promote creating common understanding and history for Burundi would be creating a 
documentation center where evidence and witness statements would be digitalised, 
analysed, systemised and preserved safely outside the country until the political 
engagement will be present in Burundi to focus on the interests of the population. Burundi 
has an oral tradition, so a lot of information is in witness statements. However, witnesses 
grow old and as change might take a while, it is vital to gather the evidence as soon as 
possible. 
The last recommendation was related to R2P and the obligation of the international 
community to take preventive action to atrocities. I described how the political tensions in 
Burundi are rising in connection to elections in 2015 and how the political elite will do 
anything to stay in power. I also demonstrated how international community has reacted to 
the developments and cautioned the current government to respect international human 
rights, but how empty warnings do not motivate the ruling party any more, and how more 
specific sanction-related activities and reforms might be relevant at this stage. 
I would like to finish with a positive note and say that despite the rather limited 
implementation of Arusha Agreement per today, the understanding formalised in that 
document is still valid. The fact that the ruling party is currently focused on its subjective 
interests does not mean that positive peace and development in Burundi are impossible. On 
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the contrary, they are attainable relatively fast due to the size of the country. What is 
required is for international community to start making ODA conditional and find ways of 
supporting reconstruction and education differently from the practice today. ODA must 
directly benefit the ordinary Burundians, not be transferred as cash grants to corrupt 
authorities. However, before that, international community must tune in to the pre-election 
as well as post-election tensions in Burundi to take action before the country relapses into 
yet another civil war. 
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